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TESTIMONY BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND
TRANSPORTATION: ACCIDENT COMPENSATION IN
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
T AM PLEASED and honored by your invitation to participate
in the process of rethinking the United States' approach to
compensation for victims of transportation disasters. Of course,
the immediate focus is on the families of those who perished in
the horrible disaster of TWA Flight #800. But that was not the
first mass disaster involving international aviation-Lockerbie
and KAL Flight #007 come to mind, and also the American Air-
lines plane bound for Cali, and I am afraid it will not be the last
one.
I have been thinking about the problem of compensation for
accident victims for some forty years, particularly in connection
with efforts to revise, abolish, or replace the Warsaw Conven-
tion. As Deputy Legal Adviser to the State Department in the
mid-1960s, I was among those who urged denunciation of the
Convention, which then limited recovery to $8,300 per person
unless "willful misconduct" was shown.' I led the American del-
egation to a famous meeting in Montreal early in 1966, which
produced no concrete results, but, I believe, changed the
world's perception about how accident victims should be com-
pensated.2 A few months later, I was a principal draftsman of
what came to be known as the Montreal Interim Agreement of
1966, which revived U.S. membership in the Warsaw system,
raised the limit of liability to $75,000 per person, and elimi-
I See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 546-52 (1967).
2 See id. at 563-75; see also ICAO, Special ICAO Meeting on Limits for Passengers
Under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154-182
(1966).
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nated, up to that amount, the issue of fault in international avia-
tion accident litigation.3 I am not altogether proud of my role
in crafting the Montreal Agreement; it was really meant to be an
interim accord, looking to a new treaty within five years, and it is
now more than thirty years old. But the Montreal Agreement
did accomplish a breakthrough both in United States law and in
the law of many other countries in that it established the princi-
ple of liability regardless of fault.
The problem of compensation for victims of transportation
disasters has both a moral and a technical dimension, and I want
to address both aspects in the brief time allotted to me.
I. THE MORAL DIMENSION OF VICTIM COMPENSATION
Taking up the moral dimension first, it is clear to me that all
accident victims and their survivors should be treated alike.
There is no justification for distinguishing between ships and
airplanes, between accidents over land or over the high seas, or
(as in TWA Flight #800) in between.' There is no justification
for distinguishing between accidents on carriers that are state-
owned, such as Iberia or Air France, as contrasted with carriers
that are privately owned, such as British Airways or American
Airlines. And from the viewpoint of the passengers or their sur-
vivors, there is no justification for distinguishing between acci-
dents caused by the fault of the carrier, the manufacturer, the
traffic controller, or a terrorist. The providers and their insur-
ers-i.e., carriers, manufacturers, and traffic controllers-
should be able to sort out their respective contribution to the
compensation of victims among themselves, and here relative
fault is an appropriate criterion. But it is of no comfort to vic-
tims of disasters to know that the cause was mechanical failure,
or pilot error, or sabotage, or that no one knows what hap-
pened, as seems to be the present status of TWA Flight #800.
3 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol, May 13, 1966, Agreement CAB 1890, approved by order
E23680 (Docket 17325).
4 "In between" because the definition of "high seas" in the Death on the High
Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 761, is one marine league, equal to three nautical
miles. However, President Reagan, by Proclamation, stated that the territorial sea
of the United States henceforth extends to 12 nautical miles from the base lines
of the United States determined in accordance with international law. See Procla-
mation No. 5928 of Dec. 27, 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 9, 1989). TWA Flight
#800 went down approximately nine nautical miles off the coast of Long Island.
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As to the amount of compensation, it is evident that no given
sum can be said to be equivalent to the value of a person's life,
and that we have no real way to measure that value. I think it
follows that limiting compensation to "pecuniary loss" in a death
case is an unjustifiable distortion, because it fails to take into
account the loss suffered by the survivors. If you kill my child, it
may save me money, yet there is no way you could hurt me
more. Therefore, non-economic as well as economic loss must
figure in ajust compensation scheme, and technical distinctions
between wrongful death and survival claims are unpersuasive.
Monetary ceilings on liability-once hotly contested-are obso-
lete, as well as being wrong on'principle. Punitive damages are
generally unjustified, except for intentional criminal conduct.
If a terrorist rocket downed TWA Flight #800, punitive damages
against the terrorist and his sponsors would be justified. Simi-
larly, if the Libyan government downed Pan Am Flight #103,
then (putting aside the intricacies of the law of state immunity)
punitive damages would be justified. But once "wilful miscon-
duct" as a way to escape the low limits of liability imposed by the
Warsaw system is made unnecessary, the whole concept can be
forgotten. No one except criminals wilfully causes an airplane
or maritime disaster. Pan Am did not intend to bring down
Flight #103, Korean Airlines did not intend to bring down Flight
#007, TWA did not intend to bring down Flight #800, American
Airlines did not intend to bring down Flight #965. What is
needed is a regime under which fair monetary compensation
can be provided for those persons who have felt the pain-eco-
nomic and non-economic-caused by a transportation disaster.
II. THE TECHNICAL DIMENSION OF
VICTIM COMPENSATION
Let me now turn to the more technical part of the discussion,
where this Committee's action, and the action of the Congress
as a whole, is critical. The House of Representatives passed a
very brief bill, providing only that the Death on the High Seas
Act (DOHSA)5 does not apply to aircraft accidents. 6 I under-
stand this as a response to the Supreme Court's decision in the
Zichernan case, 7 which held that the Death on the High Seas Act
provides the sole source for determining what harm is cogniza-
5 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-67.
3 H.R. 2005, 105th Cong. (July 28, 1997).
7 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996).
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ble and compensable in an American court for an aviation acci-
dent over the high seas, with the result that only certain stated
persons may sue for damages (section 761) and only pecuniary
loss may be compensated (section 762).
I sympathize with the proponents of this amendment, but I
think it is inadequate on several levels. First, if DOHSA is un-
fair, as I believe it is, it should not remain on the books for mari-
time disasters, any more than for aviation disasters. True, we
have not had a Titanic or Lusitania recently, but maritime disas-
ters do occur, and their victims are no less deserving of ade-
quate compensation than are victims of airplane disasters.
Second, saying DOHSA does not apply, as the House Bill does,
gives no give clue as to what law does apply, nor as to whom may
bring suit or how damages are to be measured. If Congress is
going to legislate in this area, it ought to give more guidance, so
as to avoid the unnecessary litigation that would be certain to
follow from the void created by S. 943 as it now reads.
Third, and most important, the void may be deeper than any-
one realizes. The problem arises because DOHSA as it presently
reads has two functions: (1) it creates a cause of action where it
was thought none existed previously; and (2) it specifies the ele-
ments of compensation, in ways that most of us consider inade-
quate. If DOHSA is now made inapplicable to aviation
accidents, it is not clear what law would be applicable to support
a cause of action for wrongful death.
We know now, after years of uncertainty, that the Warsaw
Convention does create a cause of action against the carrier in
international air transportation. That was the holding in the
Benjamins cases decided by the Second Circuit in 1978 and ac-
cepted since that time. But what about suits against the manu-
facturers, or even against the regulators? And what about suits
that do not come under the Warsaw Convention at all, including
domestic flights over water, and flights to non-Warsaw destina-
tions? If DOHSA does not apply, as H.R. 2005 and the Senate
counterpart,9 S. 943 would provide, and general maritime law
does not apply, as Zicherman seems to hold,1" there may not be
8 Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
11 S. 943. 105th Cong. (introducedJune 20, 1997).
10 This is not completely clear, and I would not want to be cited as authority
for that proposition. But the Second Circuit in Zicherman held that general mari-
time law does apply, Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 43 F.3d 18, 22 (2d Cir.
1994), and that decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. One may expect
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any secure source of law for an action against parties that should
be brought into a lawsuit arising out of an air accident. And,
even if general maritime law is applicable as a fallback, I do not
believe that one can be sure that the problems sought to be
cured by H.R. 2005 or S. 943 would be cured.
The law regarding compensation for maritime accidents can
only be characterized as confused. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higgin-
botham," which arose out of a helicopter accident over the Gulf
of Mexico and took back many of the benefits that seemed to
have been recognized a few years earlier in Gaudet,12 the
Supreme Court observed, correctly, that Congress had never en-
acted a comprehensive maritime code. But the Court went on
to say, incorrectly, that DOHSA announced Congress's consid-
ered judgment on such issues as the beneficiaries, the limita-
tions period, contributory negligence, survival, and damages."3
In fact, the Death on the High Seas Act was enacted as a comple-
ment to the Jones Act, 4 which in turn was designed to place
seamen in the same position as railroad workers under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act.'5 As Professor Schoenbaum has
written, the result is a "crazy-quilt pattern of wrongful death ac-
tions, 16 far from "considered judgment" and certainly not a
judgment on how to compensate victims of air transport disas-
ters. I submit that the focus of attention produced by the trag-
edy of TWA Flight #800 should spur Congress now to
"considered judgment" on how to deal with compensation for
victims of transportation accidents, or at least air transportation
accidents.
My first choice, which I have expressed over the years, v would
be a comprehensive federal statute, conferring jurisdiction on
that at the end of the day, it would be held that a product liability action based on
a disaster at sea could be brought against a manufacturer under general mari-
time law, since the rationale of Zicherman depended at least in part on the appli-
cation of the Warsaw Convention, as would not be true in actions against a
manufacturer. But counting on such a result is just inviting litigation about litiga-
tion, a phenomenon that families of accident victims know only too well.
11 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
12 Sea Land Service, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
13 See Mobile Oil, 436 U.S. at 625.
14 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994).
15 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).
16 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 465 (2d ed. 1994).
17 See my testimony on the Tydings Bill, almost thirty years ago, Aircraft Crash
Litigation: Hearings before Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 91-100 (1968). See also Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Mass Torts and the Conflict of Laws: The Airline Disaster, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 157.
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federal courts (whether exclusive or concurrent), and adopting
as substantive law the substance of what I laid out in the first
part of my testimony. If all the elements of a system of accident
compensation cannot command a majority in Congress, my sec-
ond choice would be a system that clearly establishes the juris-
dictional foundation and the principle of liability, but leaves the
elements of compensation, including pain and suffering, loss of
society, the measure of damages, and eligible beneficiaries, to
the law of the state or nation where the victim was domiciled. In
other words, if we cannot achieve agreement on substantive law,
my second choice is a federal uniform choice of law rule. I be-
lieve reference to domicile or habitual residence is most likely to
conform with the expectations of accident victims and their fam-
ilies, and most likely to result in damage awards consistent with
the relevant values and social conditions, national insurance sys-
tems, and so on. It is true that reference to domicile may result
in different awards in respect to passengers who sat side by side
before the accident. But it will avoid awards grossly excessive or
grossly inadequate in terms of the passengers' own living condi-
tions, and may well make it easier to settle accident claims with-
out the need for litigation. My colleague Allan Mendelsohn will
spell out how such a rule based on domicile would work, and
how it fits in with the recent developments among the major
airlines in waiving some of the provisions of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. ' The vision of the Warsaw Convention as providing a uni-
form measure of damages for accident victims has long ago
been rendered obsolete. I am clear that a rule looking to domi-
cile or habitual residence of the victims of an accident is more
consistent than any other with modern views of what we call con-
flict of laws and what much of the world calls private interna-
tional law.
Since my recommendation would inevitably cause at least
some delay, I ought to close with just a few words about retroac-
tivity. We know from the Supreme Court's recent decision in
the PlautM case that Congress cannot by legislation reopen final
judgments. But I do not believe that there is any impediment to
legislation that would apply to pending actions, or to claims not
yet filed, growing out of an event that occurred prior to passage
of the legislation. There is nothing unfair about retroactive leg-
'8 See Allan I. Mendelsohn, Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation: Accident Compensation in International Trans-
portation, 63J. AIR LAw & CoM. 433 (1997).
19 Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
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islation concerning mass disasters, since no one-airlines, man-
ufacturers, regulators, insurers-acted in reliance on immunity
from suit arising from a catastrophic accident. It is necessary
only that the intent of Congress is clearly expressed, as it is in
both the House and the Senate bills.
In sum, I do not believe Congress needs to rush to judgment.
I believe Congress should exercise "considered judgment,"
which is not evident in the present patchwork of statutes, trea-
ties, interim agreements, and court decisions, and is not ade-
quately reflected either in S. 943 or in H.R. 2005.
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